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TAXATION-TRUST INCOME-TAXABILITY TO PERSON OTHER THAN
SETTLOR ON BASIS OF "UNFETTERED CoMMAND"-Petitioner's father, who
owned the entire capital stock of a manufacturing corporation, bequeathed a
controlling interest therein to his wife and son, in equal shares. The widow
transferred her shares in trust to a corporate trustee, the evident purpose being
to vest in the son, petitioner here, the power to control the corporation. According to the terms of the trust the income was to be accumulated and added to
the corpus for the joint lives of the settlor and petitioner, and after death of
settlor to be disposed of according to the directions of petitioner. The shares
were to be retained and voting control maintained in the family after petitioner's
death, but this clause he later changed to provide for distribution at his death.
Overriding all these provisions were the following powers given to the petitioner:
(I) absolute power to modify or amend, including power to change beneficiaries
and appoint to himself; (2) power to withdraw any part or all of the corpus,
or revoke the trust and appropriate the trust property to himself; (3) control
over all dealings in the stock by the trustee, and over the voting of the stock by
the trustee; ( 4) power to remove the trustee. At no time during the existence
of the trust had any of the income or principal been distributed to any person, and
the income tax had been paid by the trustee on a fiduciary return. The Tax
Court sustained the commissioner's contention that the income was taxable to
petitioner under section 22 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code, the theory being
that his powers over the trust property amounted to ownership of the income.1
The facts that the purpose of the settlor had been to preserve management of
the family corporation rather than to bestow economic benefits on petition~r,

1 Chas. E. Bunting, P-H TAX CT. MEMO. DEc., 1f 46,195 (1946), citing
Mallinckrodt v. Nunan, (C.C.A. 8th, 1945) 146 F. (2d) 1; Jergens v. Comm.,
(C.C.A. 5th, 1943) 136 F. (2d) 497; Richardson v. Comm., (C.C.A. 2d, 1941)
121 F. (2d) I; and Emery v. Comm., (C.C.A. 1st, 1946) 156 F. (2d) 728.
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and that the latter had exercised none of his powers over the income, were not
significant. On appeal, held, affirmed. Bunting v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, (C.C.A. 6th, 1947) 164 F. (2d) 443.
In the general furor created by the Clifford case 2 and the later developments of the doctrine therein enunciated, the line of circuit court decisions
upon which the principal case was based has gone relatively unnoticed 8 except
by the commissioner, who codified their result 4 as an addendum to his wellknown "Clifford Regulations." Although these cases are not direct descendants
of Clifford, they are causally dependent upon that decision, the causal factor
being the willingness of the Supreme Court, evidenced therein, to extend its
"real-ownership-equals-taxability" formula into the trust field, stepping lightly
around sections 161 and 162. The Clifford decision_ was stated entirely in
terms of powers retained by the settlor, but the language did not limit its implications to this situation, and the reaction of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
was that the same re;;isoning should make the income of a trust taxable to any
other person who was given powers over the trust similar to those retained by
Clifford. 5 The other circuit courts which have followed the lead of the Second
Circuit in similar situations have also relied on their inability to see any valid
distinction between Clifford and the case at hand, and in addition have reached
back farther for their authority to two potent ideas expressed by Justice Holmes.
In Corliss v. Bowers,6 where the question was whether the income of a revocable
trust could constitutionally be taxed to the grantor, he said: "The income that
is subject to a man's unfettered command and that he is free to enjoy at his own
option may be taxed to him as his income, whether he sees fit to enjoy it or not."
And in Irwin v. Gavit 1 he nursed from an unpromising beginning in Eisner
v. Macomber 8 an idea which attained its full fruition in the Clifford case,
namely, that in enacting the provision of the revenue law, which is now section
22 (a), Congress intended to use its power to the full extent. The resultant of
the fusion of these two ideas is that the income tax law, by judicial construction,
now has its incidence on trust income initially through the medium of section
22 (a), and it is only when neither the grantor nor any other person can be
called the "owner" of the income under these doctrines that the sections of Sup2

Helvering v.. Clilford, 309 U.S. 331, 60 S.C. 554 (1940).
These cases, all of which tax trust income to a person other than the settlor on
the basis of section 22(a), are cited in 1948 P.H. FED. TAx SERv., U 15347. The
first of its kind was the Richardson case, (C.C.A. 2d, 1941) 121 F. (2d) I.
4
TREAS, REG. II 1, § 29.22(a)-22, added by T.D. 5488, Dec. 29, 1945.
This section was not made applicable to the taxable years concerned in the principal
case, and did not figure in the litigation.
11
Richardson v. Comm., (C.C.A. 2d, 1941) 121 F. (2d) 1 at 3, cert. den., 314
U.S. 684, 62 S.Ct. 188 (1941).· "We cannot suppose that a cou·rt which held the
income of a trust subject to taxation against the grantor, where there were serious
difficulties in reaching such a result, would hesitate to treat the income in a case like
the present as that of the donee of the power."
6
281 U.S. 376 at 378, 50 S.Ct. 336 (1930).
7
, 268 U.S. 161, 45 S.Ct. 475 (1925).
8
252 U.S. 189 at 203, 40 S.Ct. 189 (1920).
8
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plement E come into play.9 One of the attorneys for the taxpayer in the
Jergens case 10 attacks the circuit court opinion in that case, and this whole line
of authority, on the ground that the Supreme Court cases 'relied upon are all
cases in which the party with the power had actually exercised dominion over
the income by directing it into one channel or another, and that the principle
cannot be extended to the donee of a power who has not exercised any such
control. 11 It is unlikely that this argument will have any notable success in
view of the history of unexercised powers in the estate tax field. In fact, the
rule of these cases is apparently quite firmly entrenched, the Supreme Court
having denied certiorari in all instances when application was made. A subject
of contention which must still be settled is the question of how much power
over what a person other than the grantor must possess in order to qualify as
the owner of the income. The criterion advanced by the commissioner is that
such person may be taxed if he possesses a power exercisable solely by himself
to vest either the income or the corpus in himself,1 2 but the Tax Court has
divided on the question of whether power over income is sufficient without power
over corpus. 13
L. K. Cooperrider, S.Ed.

9 "But the contention that section 161 (a) (4) can apply here overlooks the principle that when the income of a trust must be regarded as that of the beneficiary under
section 22(a), no subsection of 161(a) can have any applicability." Tax Court
majority in Eleanor M. Funk, 7 T.C. 890 at 900 (1946). The Clifford Regulations also contain an internal priority, that is, by § 29.22(a)-22 the beneficiary
is not taxed even though he has the power to vest the income or corpus in himself
if the grantor himself is taxable under the criteria of§ 29.22(a)-21.
10 (C.C.A. 5th, 1943) 136 F. (2d) 497, supra, note I.
11 Flack, "Unexercised rights to Receive Income," 22 TAXES 2II (1944). The
author had reference to the following cases, relied upon in the Jergens opinion:
Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339, 49 S.Ct. 123 (1929); Corliss v.
Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 50 S.Ct. 336 (1930); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. I I I , 50
S.Ct. 241 (1930); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 60 S.Ct. 554 (1940);
Helvering v. Horst, 3u U.S. II2, 61 S.Ct. 144 (1940); Harrison v. Schaffner, 312
U.S. 579, 61 S.Ct. 759 (1941).
12 TREAS. REG. I 11, § 29.22(a)-22.
13 Eleanor M. Funk, 7 T.C. 890 (1946).
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